Ex ante and Ex post Moral Hazard in Public HealthInsurance in Thailand
Title:      Ex ante and Ex post Moral Hazard in Public HealthInsurance in Thailand
Categories:      Volume 12 Number 1 (january 2018)
BookID:      NER-1201012018-1
Authors:      Tongyai Iyavarakul
ISBN-10(13):      ISSN 1906 - 2540
Number of pages:      0
Language:      English
Rating:      0 
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likely comes at a cost of reducing access to health insurance of the poor.under the UC program as a preventive measure of moral hazard is therefore unnecessary andthat does not exhibit any type of moral hazard. The recent proposed copayment of beneficiariesthe estimation results show that the UC program is the only public health insurance programsheds light on the nature of moral hazard in public health insurance in Thailand. In particular,ex post moral hazard. From a policy perspective, it provides the first empirical evidence thatempirical study that simultaneously estimates the effect of health insurance on both ex ante and(SS).The contribution of this study is two-fold. From a theoretical perspective, it is a pioneeringprograms: Universal Coverage (UC), Civil Servant Medical Benefits (CSMB), and Social Securityto investigate the effect on healthcare utilization of three different public health insuranceIndividual-level data from the Supplement Household Socioeconomic Survey in 2007 were used(ex post moral hazard). This paper is the first empirical study on this issue in Thailand.behaviors (ex ante moral hazard) or increase unnecessary healthcare utilization of the beneficiarypublic debate over the possibility that the program may reduce prevention efforts of riskyeveryone in Thailand of gaining access to health insurance, there has recently been a ferventDespite the much-acclaimed success of the Universal Coverage program that ensures virtually

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